Atkinson and Harrison, I977; Shorrocks, I975), a result contradicting the hump-shaped pattern obtained from sample surveys. Shorrocks rightly remarks that 'the most likely explanation is that the two data surveys are representative of different sets of people'. Estate-duty statistics are relative to more affluent individuals who are found, here also, to depart from the accumulation behaviour predicted by a (no-bequest) life-cycle model.
Interpreting these age-wealth variations as individual accumulation behaviour over time encounters a serious difficulty, however: cross-section data, even if corrected to take into account secular growth, are often poor proxies for longitudinal profiles. Using British estate-duty statistics covering sixty years, Shorrocks thus obtains mortality-adjusted' cohort profiles, in constant prices, which show the desired hump pattern, although more pronounced for the less weal thy.2 Our paper studies the behaviour of wealth-holdings according to age for French households during the post-war period (I 949-75). It relies upon longitudinal data for several cohorts split into eight occupational groups.3 Indeed, a systematic cohort analysis is necessary to detect common underlying features in the accumulation process of different cohorts of a given group. These invariants can then be interpreted as stable long-term age effects.
In Section I we argue that lifetime profiles cannot be inferred from a single cross-section since important vintage effects have occurred during the post-war period. Lacking longitudinal direct information we use in Section II a simulation accounting model that allows us to reconcile and complete available statistics relative to wealth and its variation so as to reconstitute synthetic wealth cohort profiles.
In Section III, to derive long-term age effects from these historical profiles, two alternative methods are used: the first one tries to disentangle age effects from period or cohort effects while bringing to light the most significant changes for wealth that have occurred since the war, whereas the second aims at a direct determination of age effects while deriving a steady state for the simulation model, that is supposed to capture the structural features of the post-war period. In Section IV, results show that one can find every possibility: instability (small-scale self-employed), stability but no hump shape (wealthy self-employed) and two different hump-shaped stable profiles among wage earners.
In Section V it is shown that a non-voluntary bequest version of the L.C.H. allowing for uncertainty of death in an imperfect capital market can broadly 'explain' the results obtained for the wage-earning groups.
1 The rich living longer, an adjustment for differential mortality has to be introduced. 2 Shorrocks' results however need further qualification. There is for instance the problem of consistency over time (relative position of the exemption level, changes in legislation, etc.). Also, Shorrocks neglects another correction for demographic change: considering the minimum wealth of the top Io %, he posits that they form a stable cohort. This is true only if there is no intra-cohort wealth mobility, an unlikely assumption when compared with the high intra-cohort mobility of income revealed by recent studies. 8 To infer accumulation behaviour one must then consider the incidence of inter-group mobility over time. On the other hand, Shorrocks' demographic composition adjustment is considerably reduced within occupational groups; moreover, household wealth variations in old age are influenced by an offsetting effect due to the increased number of widowed persons having 'lost' already bequeathed assets. There would nevertheless be one way out, if these awkward non-neutral time effects on wealth growth could be attributed to similar non-stationarities affecting the growth of income, or better, permanent income. In this case, a longitudinal direct interpretation of cross-sections relative to the ratio of wealth to permanent income would be legitimate. The variation of this ratio with age has been studied cross-sectionally by King and Dicks-Mireaux (I982). They justify the choice of that variable essentially by the fact that the L.C.H. humpshaped pattern concerns a wealth-age relationship controlled for the effect of differences in permanent income. From an econometric analysis of a sample survey for Canada in I977, they draw an age-profile for the ratio of wealth to permanent income which is rather like the French wage-earner wealth-age curve in I967. In fact they do not venture to explain the 'puzzling dip' around age 55 by any life-cycle factor (such as, for instance, gifts inter vivos) but invoke as 'one possible explanation' a vintage effect, namely a start of working life for these households during World War IJJ1 It thus seems as if there is no direct way to get rid of non-neutral time effects on age cross-sections. We are therefore forced to look for longitudinal wealth profiles: those represented on Fig. I We refer to households (the unit of account in most statistics). Moreover, we consider gross wealth rather than net wealth although the latter measure is the more usual one. Our choice, motivated both by conceptual and statistical problems,2 has no important bearing for this study, which focuses on wealthholding patterns during the late years of life when debts are almost nil.
Another characteristic of the model must be underlined. relative to the cohort (x, t -a) of occupational group x and age a at time t. It is, however, convenient to begin by analysing the wealth variation of a single household. A household's variation of wealth is, in fact, the sum of two components. The first is the result of the relationships between the household and the economic system (savings, capital gains, etc.) and depends mainly on the types of I1 The four self-employed groups are: farmers, industrialists or commercial entrepreneurs, craftsmen and shopkeepers, and professionals. Wage-earners are divided into executives, middle management, white-collar and blue-collar workers. A dynamic group model also requires that the retired people should be reclassified in their category of origin: some French statistics (like the C.R.E.P. 1975 wealth survey) provide fortunately explicit information on their previous occupation.
2 The usual measure of net wealth is current legal equity, which subtracts from gross wealth the amount of the debt in capital, say E. This measure is only justified in the rare cases where the loan is sold or interrupted by earlier full reimbursement. An 'L.C.H. adapted' definition of net wealth, which allows for the central equation (6) in this paper (see below) to hold, should rather deduce from gross wealth the value, denoted D, of the discounted sum of future total repayments (both in interest and capital) using, as rate of discounting r, the average total rate of return on wealth (including both income yields and capital gains but net of taxes and depreciation).
The value of debt D decreases much more rapidly than E according to the number of repayments already made. Moreover, low borrowing rates in France during the period considered (negative in real terms when the real value of r was 3 % per year) imply that D will already be largely inferior to E at the beginning of the loan. It follows that the difference between gross and net wealth is much lower than usually expected. But the main difficulties for measuring net wealth are empirical. Reliable statistics for the amount of loan or total repayment do exist since at least 1955, but sample survey estimates of D or E are both scarce and shaky before I 967 and do not allow us to obtain reliable net wealth profiles before that date. accumulation behaviour of the agent considered. This variation, linked to economic activity, is heavily dependent upon quantities observed or calculated outside the model.
The second takes into account the household's membership of a 'family dynasty': it is the dynastic variation which concerns circulation of wealth among households without relationship to other agents (at least, without relationships other than fiscal). For that reason, most of its elements are calculated within the model (we thus avoid relying directly on scarce and often unreliable statistics that are used instead in tests of coherence).
(a) Variation linked to economic activity (single household). The calculation of this variation supposes that one draws up the balance of the household's economic activity during the year. We make here a distinction between the 'realised variation', which assembles the elements of the balance that were the object of a transaction during the year, and the 'potential variation', composed of variation elements not usually marked by an exchange. The first includes savings and debts; the second, nominal capital gains and variations in volume of intangible elements of firms. This division underlies the random nature, closely linked to market fluctuations, of some wealth-variation elements.
Neglecting-second-order terms, this first variation, AW,, can be written (in a simplified form):
AW, =/W+Y-C+AL,
where 1t is the weighted average, depending upon wealth structure, of the discrete rates of potential variation of assets, Yis total disposable income, C is consumption and AL is the net variation of liabilities, i.e. the balance between loans (professional or real estate) incurred and repayments during the year. (b) Dynastic variation (single household). The demographic analysis of the household is complex: its beginning often corresponds to the departure of children from their parents' home, but divorces are also accompanied by the creation of an additional household. A marriage can result in the creation of a household in the case where husband and wife were living with their parents, in a dissolution if both were already heads of household, in no effect in other cases. The household can survive the death of one of its members and even change age group if the head of the household dies, leaving his or her place to a younger or older spouse.' These family movements are accompanied by wealth transfers (sharing of wealth in the case of a marriage, legacy to children, etc.): this results in dynastic variation; it must also include other private transfers between generations, such as financial assistance and gifts inter vivos.
Thus, provided that the household survives, its dynastic variation may be written:
AW2= K+G2-G, -CD + MP,
1 The age and occupation of the household are by hypothesis those of the head: the household income and wealth are the sums of those of its members. The fact that aged people disappear as independent households has been overlooked in the model. Franco Modigliani pointed to us that it creates a potential upward bias at the end of the wealth-age profiles, since those are likely to be the poorest.
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where K is inheritance and G2 gifts received from their parents and G1 gifts bestowed to their children (reverse wealth transfers, from children to parents, have been overlooked as well as transfers between grandparents and children). CD is wealth taken by children leaving home to set up their own households. Finally MP is the resulting (positive or negative) effect of marriages, divorces and other changes in the mating pattern.
(c) Variation of average wealth of a cohort. At a cohort level (defined by group and generation), the wealth variation is the sum of three components: the variation linked to economic activity, the dynastic variation and an adjustment resulting from the mobility between groups, the main movement during the post-war period being the shift to wage-earning status (mostly blue-collar workers) of the small-scale self-employed (mostly farmers). The calculation of the first and third components presents us mainly with data problems, but dynastic variation computation needs a certain number of simplifying hypotheses, since the pattern of relationships between household and family appears to be relatively complex. In fact, we can use a rather simple demographic submodel as we are working at a group level with only an empirical objective. ' Let us emphasise only the two major hypotheses used for deriving dynastic variation. The first one concerns family structure by age: we assume that husband and wife are of the same age, as are their children; one can thus define the age difference between generations, called d. This hypothesis is fairly rough but acceptable at a group level and makes calculations far simpler.
The study of family wealth transfers assumes that wealth distribution among family members is known. The second hypothesis states that all individuals of the same age and the same group have the same amount at a given instant; notably a couple's wealth is equally shared between husband and wife (an assumption consistent with the existence of a strong social homogamy in France). This hypothesis is further extended to estate division patterns by assuming that the first parent to die will pass his own wealth to the children, the surviving parent keeping her own wealth.2 Equal sharing between heirs is also assumed, as it is enforced by law in France.
The second hypothesis leads to a certain heterogeneity of household wealth within a cohort, and a simple relationship links average individual wealth w to average household wealth W. Let ,u' denote the percentage of married individuals in the cohort and define the variable ,u by the relationship: ,u = I-#'12 we obtain then w = ,uW. 
III. ESTIMATING WEALTH-AGE EFFECTS
In order to bring to light a stable, long-term age-wealth relationship for each occupational group two independent methods have been used. The first one applies a heuristic cohort analysis to the historical wealth profiles generated by the EPHEBE model. The second one makes the model converge to a steady-state cross-sectional distribution of wealth by age and occupational group. The two methods are complementary: the first one is especially designed for estimating age-effects stability over time, the second is more appropriate to obtain precise specifications of these age effects. 1 The two sources for gifts come from estate duty statistics and from a C.R.E.P. sample survey in 1975 collecting recall data on the dates and amounts of intergenerational transfers received or bestowed by French households (see Kessler, 1979 or Kessler and Masson, 1979) . The share of the donor's wealth bestowed to children is found to increase with age but varies little with occupation and remains stable through time. However, there has been a regular increase of the annual percentage of donors, more likely to be in their fifties and professionals, farmers or executives. The donor's age has also decreased during the post-war period, so that parents' wealth transfers are now more evenly distributed over the life-cycle. form of a function F(a, t, 1, x) depending upon age a, time t, generation 1 (date of birth) and occupational group x. It is well known that one cannot avoid a basic identification problem owing to the linear relation between vintage, calendar time and age (a = t -1), unless one is prepared to go further by attributing time effects to specific factors and/or by setting a priori constraints on age effects derived from some theoretical considerations (Weiss and Lillard, I 978; Jonsson and Klevmarken, I 978) .
Our purpose is to avoid any a priori specification of the wealth-age relationship. But the historical reconstitution of accumulation profiles has allowed us to identify three major time effects during the post-war period.
The first and most important one is a real per capita growth of wealth at an average rate of 3 % over the period. Secondly, at least since I 955, there has been an important expansion in real estate purchases by households aged between 25 and 40, mainly through indebtedness eased by very low borrowing rates. This phenomenon thus concerned mainly cohorts born in the twenties who also benefited (especially between I955 and I962) from very high returns to real estate (both in income yields and capital gains).' Thirdly there has been a regular increase of gifts inter vivos, bestowed by parents mostly between ages 45 and 6o. With these facts in mind, the analysis focuses on the nominal rate of wealth accumulation by age in different cohorts: 01, (a) = 0(a,t = a+l,l,x), with averages over all occupational groups, 01 (a). The procedure is best described with the help of'standard cohort tables' (see Glenn, I977), represented approximately by Table i for i1 (a): age brackets and time subperiods of the same length (here 7 years) are juxtaposed in columns and rows respectively, so that one can trace cohort profiles on diagonals. If time effects play a minor role, figures obtained for a given age should vary little from one column to another.
To take into account real per capita growth of wealth one can consider the ratio of growth rates at specific age, 01(a), to average growth rate (last row in Table i ). With this correction Table i still shows some discrepancies in the age profiles within each column, such as the higher wealth growth rates after I955 for young households. But this gap is mostly accounted for by the rise in real estate purchase, as can be roughly checked by performing alternative simulations 1 This relative increase in wealth, especially important among wage-earners, explains why the double-humped shape of their age-wealth cross-section in I 967 is more the result of a 'puzzling hump' around age 45, that is also apparent for net wealth (see Fig. I for net wealth as legally defined: the I967 curve for an 'L.C.H. adapted' definition of net wealth -see footnote 2 on p. 177 -will be contained between the two I967 curves plotted on Fig. i) If the tables for one group show only limited differences between columns, which are largely explained by the time effects already mentioned, wealth-age effects are considered 'stable' for that group. If some important unexplained discrepancies remain, age effects are considered 'unstable'. Furthermore, the method allows relative -if not very accurate -characterisations of stable age effects if one compares the age-growth rates for particular ages derived for a given group with those obtained for the overall population.
III.2. Age Effects Derivedfrom a Steady State
The second method interprets directly asymptotic wealth cross-sectional distributions derived from a steady state in terms of age effects: indeed, the steady states corresponding to balanced growth, age cross-sections and cohort profiles of wealth in constant prices coincide except for a uniform real-growth effect.
The steady state is designed to capture the structural features of the post-war period (Masson and Strauss-Kahn, I979). From average data representative of the last quarter century, on income, savings, capital gains, etc., kept constant in time, a convergence is attempted from the known wealth distribution of I975 towards an invariant distribution representative of a steady state. The method is relevant whenever a steady state exists that is both unique and independent of the initial wealth distribution.
Practically, after having chosen a set of time-invariant values for the exogeneous parameters' appearing in relation (4) For all their shortcomings, the two methods lead to much more convincing conclusions concerning the wealth-age relationship when, age effects being stable, the broad characterisations of age effects derived from the cohort analysis appear in close agreement with the specifications obtained in the steady-state framework. These conditions are fulfilled for 6 out of the 8 occupational groups. Fig. 2 a-c, representing the steady-state age-wealth cross-sections, clearly show that these groups can be put in three distinct categories according to their accumulation behaviour. Wealthy self-employed, including industrialists or commercial entrepreneurs and professionals, follow a regular hump-shaped pattern with maximum wealth at age 59, while age curves for wage-earners have a double peak (one peak may be reduced to a plateau), the first one around age 45, the second around 6o. But maximum wealth is at age 45 for modest wage-earners, that is for white-collar and blue-collar workers, and at age 6o for wealthier wage-earners, including executives and middle management. Note that the wealth-age cross-section for the whole population (eight groups altogether) is more like those of wealthier wage-earners (see Fig. 2 b) .
To obtain the longitudinal profiles (in constant prices) the steady-state crosssections must be corrected for a constant rate of real growth of at least 3 % per year (the average rate for the I 949-75 period). On these profiles, which are more appropriate for studying the late years of life, the age of maximum wealth remains 59 for blue-collar workers and up to 65 for wealthy self-employed and executives.4 But the most interesting concerns the average annual rate of decline after age 65 (until age 8o or 85): this rate is very low, around 0o7 % for wealthy self-employed, to be compared with rates for wage-earners between 3 % (modest 1 Provided one knows for each year the wealth amount for young households who 'enter' the model: we have chosen to make those amounts equal to those for 1975. 2 Using matrix manipulations and properties of norms in finite dimensional spaces, it can be shown that the convergence of the sequence (We) depends on certain inequalities verified by the coefficients of the linear system (4). In practice the iteration is stopped, as usual, when a measure of the difference between W. and W,+, becomes less than a given threshold.
3 It is to be noted that the goal of this method is not to produce any accurate forecast but simply to reveal some underlying structural features of the wealth-accumulation process during the post-war period. But even with this limited ambition the method has obvious weaknesses ( ones) and 4 % (wealthy ones). In any case the average amount of wealthholding is still substantial among the aged (say at age 8o), a fact contradicting the elementary basic form of the L.C.H., which also predicts higher rates of decumulation after retirement. The cohort analysis does not lead to stable age effects over the post-war period for the last two groups, that is for farmers and craftsmen or shopkeepers. If their rates of accumulation are not too far from those of the wealthy selfemployed before I962, both groups undergo a severe downgrading after that year, mainly before age 40.
Moreover, these results are not fully consistent with those derived from the steady-state method. Indeed, craftsmen and shopkeepers seem to adopt in the long run an accumulation behaviour which is intermediate between those of wealthy self-employed and wealthy wage-earners (see Fig. 2 a) , as if the downgrading after i962 was only temporary. Conversely, farmers seem to adopt the accumulation behaviour of workers (see Fig. 2 c) as if the decline after I 962 was a permanent one for them.
These last results should be cautiously interpreted. Age-effect instability, especially for farmers, is in part the outcome of the heterogeneous and changing 
where q(a) is the instantaneous mortality quotient (equal to -X(a) if X(a) is the logarithmic age-derivative of the survival probability at age a): uncertainty changes only the rate of time preference by the additional term q (a) depending on age. On blocked intervals, of course, C(a) equals non-property income YL(a). Now the variation of non-human wealth W(a) is given in every case by the relation:
With the most plausible values of the parameters -leading notably to a rather high relative risk aversion -the income effect or precautionary motive is found by Davies largely to dominate a limited substitution effect -the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, I/y, being small. The introduction of uncertainty leads therefore to a considerable reduction in rates of wealth decumulation during retirement obtained under certainty. Using Canadian data (including 'non-investment income in retirement') Davies finds that 'the average rate of decumulation between ages 65 and 85 falls from 7-o to 2-9 %'. This last value of say 3 % is close enough to our corresponding empirical estimates for wage-earners, but remains markedly too high to account for the quasi-absence of wealth decumulation among wealthy self-employed. For this last category at least we should have to include other motives for holding wealth, for voluntary bequests but also for power, social status, etc. Using Davies' model to account for differences in accumulation behaviour between the two categories of wage-earners, it is useful to write relation (6) in the form: (5)) that is, at a later date for a higher rate r.
With these observations in mind one can see that in the framework of Davies' model three factors may account for the later peak in the age-wealth crosssection of executives and middle management.
Their form of saving is different from that of white-collar and blue-collar workers so that they benefit on the average from higher rates of return to wealth (r -F is positive for executives, negative for workers).
They have generally longer life expectancies. Their earnings-age distribution is more heavily concentrated in older ages (maximum earnings is attained later in life) and they retire later in life.
It is to be noted that these last differences could be deduced from the two first factors in a model of human capital investment.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The possibility of a stable age-wealth relationship for eight occupational groups of French households during the post-war period has been analysed. For that purpose two complementary methods of cohort analysis have been applied to synthetic longitudinal wealth profiles generated by a simulation accounting model.
Cohort and period effects have considerably altered age-wealth cross-sections over the years, and prevent any direct life-cycle interpretations of these distributions.
The age-wealth relationship appears unstable for small-scale self-employed, notably farmers: that means that life-cycle factors do not play a clearly defined independent role in the accumulation process of this population.
Stable age effects were obtained for the other groups, with a hump-shaped pattern among wage-earners that vanishes as we reach higher income categories (wealthy self-employed). These results are, at least qualitatively, quite similar to those obtained in Britain (Shorrocks, I975), in the United States (Wolff, 1980) and in Canada (King and Dick-Mireaux, 1982 and more specifically Burbidge and Robb, 1983 for age-effects variations among social groups).
Life-cycle models without a bequest motive can 'explain' age-wealth profiles obtained for wage-earners if they allow for the uncertainty of survival in the absence of life annuities of Yaari's type. The question then is the explanation for the empirically observed unimportance of such annuities in (elderly) household portfolios.
This scarcity of annuities can be the consequence in France of historical factors, notably the lack of indexation against inflation. One can also note the criticisms that are traditionally made of existing market insurance: moral hazard, adverse selection, deception, and transaction costs (including time costs). But how can one explain the fact that old householders rarely sell their homes on an instalment payment to be provided with a life annuity that would avoid a great deal of the drawbacks mentioned above?
Of course wealth-holding motives ignored by the L.C.H. (social status, economic power, free disposal) and social-cultural constraints ofnot depriving one's children of expected inheritance can be invoked. Some authors (e.g. Kotlikoff and Spivak, I98I) have further claimed that the family plays the role of a proxy for an ideal annuity market. This explanation requires, however, a more careful study of the nature of social relations within the family, based as they are on principles which are often incompatible with those governing market activities.
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